Welcome to the MS Game Theory
& Experiments page of
Dr. Artie Zillante
All files in pdf format unless noted.
Syllabus
Calendar (in html)
Chapter Outlines for Gibbons:
Note: The only human being who has proofread these notes is me. I have tried to be diligent, but I am human. Errors may exist - I am not one to put an error in just to see if you are paying attention, so let me know if something does not make sense.
Methods of proof (from Epp)
Chapter 1 - Simultaneous games with complete information
Chapter 2 - Sequential games with complete information
Chapters 1 & 2 - Games with a continuum of strategies (Cournot and Bertrand)
Chapter 3 - Simultaneous games with incomplete information
Chapter 4 - Sequential games with incomplete information
Notes on Bayes Theorem
Monty Hall problem (application of Bayes Theorem)
Notes on Experiments:
Summary and some comments on Smith's 1982 AER paper
PowerPoint slides on the making of the global games experiment by Shapiro, Shi, and Zillante
PowerPoint slides on the "Evolution of an Experiment on Exit in Duopoly" by Oprea, Wilson, and Zillante
Experimental Design
Notes on data analysis and nonparametric statistics
Notes on Cox, Roberson, and Smith and Auction Theory
Notes on Field Experiments (Harrison and List 2004 JEL paper)
Notes on Market Experiments
Some reasons why economic experiments with humans are reviewed
There are many experimental economists who would argue that, and I am paraphrasing even though it is in quotes, "We are not requiring anything of subjects than we might in a typical classroom setting, so why should we have to deal with an IRB or Human Subjects Committee". Here are some reasons why:
The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (1932-1972)
The Nazi Medical Experiments (WWII)
Those first 2 experiments involve medical practices, so they have a somewhat questionable link to what an experimental economist does (unless the experimental economist is involved in neuroeconomics). This next set of experiments are a little closer to what an experimental economist might do, except that we might give the "teacher" incentives for each time he obeyed an order (though many didn't need the additional incentives to obey the experimenter).
The Milgram Experiments (1961-1985)
UNCC Human Subjects Information
Human Subjects Website
Human Subjects Tutorial (can be taken as a guest, but must be passed as a non-guest before human subjects projects can begin)
Background readings on the experimental methodology and some early market experiments:
Note that these links are from JSTOR so you may need to log into the library's system using your Novell account if you wish to access them from home.
Smith, V. “Microeconomic Systems as Experimental Science” American Economic Review 72 (1982) 923-955
This paper lays the groundwork tying experiments and microeconomics together as a science. It's a more rigorous discussion that can be read along with chapters 3 and 4 of the Friedman and Cassar text.
Smith, V. “An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior” Journal of Political Economy 70 (1962) 111-137. Also, see Errata on pages 322-323 of the next issue of the journal.
This is Smith's early experiment on the double auction institution that establishes that the economic institution is an important feature that can affect market outcomes.
This is just a quick read by Plott (basically the guy who got Smith to start doing experiments again) trying to predict the future of experiments in economics.
This is Smith's revised Nobel lecture.
This is Kahneman's revised Nobel lecture.
Chamberlain, E. “An Experimental Imperfect Market” Journal of Political Economy 56 (1948) 95-108.
This is Chamberlain's experiment on the "random meetings" institution. This is the experiment that spurred Smith to run the double auction experiments.
There are many more papers that a budding experimentalist can read. These are just to get you started and provide some background of where experimental economics has come from and where it has gone. Also, there is a long history of individual choice experiments (dating back to Thurstone before the Chamberlinian experiment) as well as some interesting early game theoretic experiments done in the 1950s and 1960s.
There are books on bargaining behavior by Fouraker and Siegel (one in 1960 and one in 1963 - I have read most of the 1963 book and enjoyed it) and there is a book containing game theoretic experiments edited by Thrall, Coombs, and Davis, Decision Processes, published in 1954 (I have not read this book so I do not know how useful one might find it). Also, for some of the introductory material I will draw from Chapter 1 of The Handbook of Experimental Economics edited by John Kagel and Al Roth, but you do not need to read that material.
Assignments
Assignment 1 Answers to 1
Assignment 2 Answers to 2
Assignment 3 Answers to 3
Assignment 4 Answers to 4
Assignment 5 Answers to 5
Assignment 6 Answers to 6
Global Games Data
Global Games Instructions
Exams
Answers to 1
Answers to 2

