Welcome to the research of
Dr. Artie Zillante
Publications
Links to these papers may require a subscription to view the full articles. Links to coauthor sites will open a new window. Most files are pdf format.
Refereed journal articles:
1. Naming Your Own Price Mechanisms: Revenue Gain or Drain?, with Dmitry Shapiro, (2009), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 72, 725-737.
-- Electronic Appendix for Shapiro & Zillante, Naming Your Own Price Mechanisms: Revenue
Gain or Drain?
2. "A Theory of Jump Bidding in Ascending Auctions", with Mark Isaac and Tim Salmon, (2007), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62:1, 144-164.
3. "An Experimental Test of Alternative Models of Bidding in Ascending Auctions", with Mark Isaac and Tim Salmon (2005), International Journal of Game Theory, 33:2, 287-313.
4. "The Campus Parking Game: A Classroom Experiment in Price Discrimination and Consumer Welfare", with Jeffrey Michael, Sarah Stafford, Greg Buchholz, Katherine Guthrie, and Julie Heath. (2005), Southern Economic Journal, 71:3, 661-682.
Book
Chapters:
1. "A Review of the Post-WWII Baseball Card Industry", (2008), in The Business of Sports (Volume 3), ed. Brad Humphreys and Dennis Howard, Praeger Publishers: Westport, CT, pgs. 241-272.
Working
Papers and Works in Progress:
1. An Experiment on Exit in Duopoly, with Ryan Oprea and Bart Wilson
2. Recognizing and Playing Turn Taking Strategies
3. Squeezing Lemonade into Lemons: Making Efficient Markets Inefficient, with Bart Wilson,
R&R, Rev. of IO
-- Electronic Appendix for Wilson & Zillante, Squeezing Lemonade into Lemons: Making
Efficient Markets Inefficient
4. A Comparison of Generalized Plurality and Cumulative Voting, with Duane Cooper
5. Equilibria in the Circular City
6. Robustness of Level-k Reasoning in Generalized Beauty Contest Games, with Dmitry Shapiro
and Xianwen Shi
7. Complying with Criteria or Relying on Reputation? An Analysis of Gold Glove Award Voting
8. Spaced-out Monopolies: Theory and Empirics of Alternating Product Release
9. Sequential Auctions with Partial Information
